Abstract-We consider the task of communicating a data stream-a long, possibly infinite message not known in advance to the sender-over a channel with adversarial noise. For any given noise rate c < 1, we show an efficient, constant-rate scheme that correctly decodes a (1 − c) fraction of the stream sent so far with high probability, or aborts if the noise rate exceeds c. In addition, we prove that no constant-rate scheme can recover more than a (1 − c) fraction of the stream sent so far with non-negligible probability, which makes our scheme optimal in that aspect. The parties are assumed to preshare a random string unknown to the channel. Our techniques can also be applied to the task of interactive communication (two-way communication) over a noisy channel. In a recent paper (Braverman and Rao, STOC11), the possibility of two-party interactive communication as long as the noise level is <1/4 was shown. By allowing the parties to preshare some private random string, we extend this result and construct a (nonefficient) constant-rate interactive protocol that succeeds with overwhelming probability against noise rates up to 1/2. We complete this result by proving that no constant-rate protocol can withstand noise rates >1/2.
The added redundancy helps Bob in recovering the original message if possible, or aborting otherwise. The overhead of this process is the amount of redundancy added to each message.
Interestingly, in all known authentication schemes (and in many of the error-correction codes) there are two important assumptions: (1) the message to be communicated has a given length n and (2) the message is fully known to the sender in advance. These two assumptions don't hold anymore when the information to be transmitted is in the form of a data stream, which is a long, possibly infinite, sequence of symbols x 1 , x 2 , . . . , where each x i arrives at the sender's end at time i and is unknown beforehand. In this work we focus on constant-rate schemes, i.e., schemes that encode each symbol x i into a constant number of symbols. Thus, at any given time, the transmitted message is at most constant-times longer than the original message.
In this paper, we investigate the question of transmitting data streams over an adversarially (i.e., worst-case) noisy channel, where the noise is only bounded by the total amount of corrupted symbols, e.g., the noise corrupts at most some fixed fraction of the communicated symbols.
Within this framework we consider two related questions, namely, error-correction and authentication of data streams. Loosely speaking, in error-correction schemes, the receiver decodes the correct message as long as the noise level is below some threshold (but possibly outputs a wrong message if the noise exceeds that threshold). In authentication schemes, the receiver's task is to indicate whether or not the received (decoded) message is indeed the one sent to him. To see the relation between these two tasks note that if the corruption level of an adversary is guaranteed to be lower than the threshold, any error-correction guarantees that the receiver decodes the original message. However, while no constant-rate error-correction scheme can withstand a noise level higher than 1/2, this is not the case for authentication schemes that are capable of indicating a change in the message even when the adversary's noise level is not bounded. On the other hand for the task of authentication, it is generally assumed that the parties preshare a secret key.
Standard error-correction and authentication methods do not apply directly to the model of data streams. The straightforward method to perform error-correction (or authentication) of a data stream is to cut the stream into chunks and separately encode each chunk. The problem now is that while the adversary is limited to some global noise rate, there is no restriction on the noise level of any local part of the stream. Specifically, the adversary can corrupt a single chunk in its 0018 -9448 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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entirety (while not exceeding the global amount of allowed noise), and cause Bob to decode this chunk in a wrong way. Even if this event is noticed by Bob since the chunk fails the authentication, the information carried within this chunk is lost unless Bob requests a retransmission of that chunk, i.e., unless the communication is interactive. The same problem exists (with high probability) when the noise is random rather than adversarial, given that the stream is long enough or infinite. A possible mitigation to the above is to increase the chunks' size. This, however, has an undesirable side effect-Bob needs to wait until receiving a complete chunk in order to decode and authenticate it. This means that the information received in the very recent bits is inaccessible to Bob until the chunk is completely received. Our goal is thus, to construct a constant-rate scheme that can withstand a constant fraction of errors (globally) and still guarantee the correct decoding and authenticity of the information received so far.
A. Our Results
In this work we construct optimal encoding schemes for both interactive and non-interactive (streaming) communication, and show a dramatic difference between these two cases in the following sense. For each case, we show an upper bound on the amount of noise that still allows a successful constant-rate communication, and construct a protocol that achieves the bound. Interestingly, the bound for one-way communication is different from the interactive one.
Specifically, our result for one-way communication is a constant-rate coding scheme for data streams that withstands noise rates of less than 1/2. Informally, as long as the global noise rate up to some time n does not exceed some parameter c < 1/2, a fraction of 1 − 2c of the stream sent up to time n can be recovered (see Section IV). For constant-rate schemes, it is clear that c < 1/2 is a hard limit and no scheme can succeed when the noise is higher. In order to achieve schemes that withstand higher noise rates we must relax the model and give the users more resources. Indeed, with the use of shared randomness (i.e., a shared secret key) we can break the c = 1/2 barrier. To emphasize the fact that the parties are allowed to share a secret key, we refer schemes in this model as authentication schemes rather than error-correction schemes, based on the relation of these two tasks mentioned above (codes that assume a private shared key are also known as private codes [21] , see related work in Section I-C).
This leads to our first main result: we construct a constant-rate authentication scheme for data streams sent over a noisy adversarial channel. For any constant fraction of noise c less than 1, our scheme succeeds in decoding at least a (1 − c)-fraction of the stream so far, with high probability. The decoded part is always the prefix of the stream. The decoded prefix is authenticated, meaning that there is only a negligible probability that the scheme outputs a different string. Furthermore, our scheme is efficient. More formally (see formal theorems in Section V), we show that for any noise rate 0 ≤ c < 1 and small constant ε > 0:
• There exists an efficient constant-rate scheme that, at time n, decodes a prefix of length at least (1 − c)n − εn of the stream sent so far.
• Any constant-rate protocol that decodes a prefix of length (1 − c)n + εn succeeds with probability at most 2 − (εn) in the worst case. Our scheme is unconditionally secure and does not make any (cryptographic) assumptions, other than presharing a private random string. The amount of randomness utilized by the scheme grows with the message length, and can be unbounded if the data stream is infinite. However, if we only consider a computationally bounded adversary, the required amount of randomness is relatively small: polynomial in the security parameter. With the aid of a pseudo-random generator, the parties only need to preshare a small seed, from which they generate randomness at will. Moreover, such a solution scales to the multiparty case by a simple public-key infrastructure construction. Each user generates a pair of a public and a secret key, and any pair of users perform Diffie-Hellman key-exchange [9] to obtain a secret shared authentication-key used as the pseudo-random generator's seed.
We apply the techniques used for our streamingauthentication scheme onto the task of interactive communication to get our second main result. In the interactive communication scenario, two parties perform an arbitrary interactive protocol over a noisy channel, while keeping the amount of exchanged data only a constant factor more than an equivalent protocol for a noiseless channel (i.e., the encoding is constant-rate). This question was initially considered for both random and adversarial noise by Schulman [26] - [28] who showed a constant-rate encoding scheme that copes with a noise rate of up to 1/240, and recently revisited by Braverman and Rao [8] who showed how to deal with noise rates less than 1/4. In addition, Braverman and Rao show that 1/4 is the highest error rate any protocol can withstand, as long as the protocol defines whose turn it is to speak at every round regardless of the observed noise. The fascinating open question left by the work of Braverman and Rao is whether other methods could extend the 1/4 bound.
In this work we improve the bound obtained by [8] by allowing the parties to preshare a secret key. Specifically, we show how to convert any interactive protocol (for noiseless channel) into a constant-rate protocol that withstands any adversarial noise level smaller than 1/2, given preshared randomness. We also show that for higher noise rates, no constant-rate interactive protocol exists for tasks that depend on inputs of both parties. Similar to previous results for interactive communication with adversarial noise [8] , [28] , our decoding scheme is inefficient.
We further observe that if communication is performed over an erasure channel, we can resist erasure rate of up to 1/2 − ε with a constant rate and without the need for presharing randomness. This is obtained by employing our analysis on the scheme of Braverman and Rao [8] . Our analysis thus implies that the scheme of [8] is optimal for the erasure channel model, since with erasure rate 1/2, the adversary can completely delete the outgoing communication of a single party. However, the obtained scheme is not efficient.
The subsequent work of Efremenko, Gelles and Haeupler [10] further investigates the case of erasure channels and provides a simple and efficient scheme that is randomly mapped to a symbol of . Symbols of with no incoming arrow are "booby-traps", which detect corruptions.
resists erasure levels of up to 1/2. Surprisingly, the scheme of [10] assumes a channel with a fixed small alphabet (namely, of size 6), as opposed to all previous schemes, in which the size of the alphabet increases as a function of the tolerable noise rate. Furthermore, for the case of binary erasure channels, they provide a simple and efficient scheme that tolerates an erasure rate of up to 1/3.
B. Our Methods 1) The Blueberry Code:
The main ingredient of our construction is an error-detection code we name the Blueberry code. 1 The Blueberry code uses the shared randomness in order to detect corruptions made by the channel, and marks them as erasures. One can think about this random code as a weak information-theoretic message authentication code that authenticates each symbol separately with a constant probability (see [19] ). To this end, each symbol of the input alphabet is randomly and independently mapped to a larger alphabet (the channel alphabet). This means that only a small subset of the channel alphabet is meaningful and the other symbols serve as "booby-traps", see Figure 1 . Since each symbol is encoded independently, any corruption is caught with constant probability | |−1 | |−1 and marked with a special sign ⊥ to denote it was deleted by the channel. Most of the corruptions made by an adversary become erasures and only a small fraction (arbitrarily small, controlled by the size of | |) turns into errors.
The main insight that leads to our results is the different ways error correction codes deal with errors and erasures. We observe that, in terms of Hamming distance, the impact of a single error is twice as harmful as a single erasure. Indeed, assume that the Hamming distance of two strings, x and y, is m. Then if x was communicated but y is decoded it means that at least m/2 errors have occurred, or alternatively, at least m erasures. More generally, assuming we decode by minimizing the Hamming distance, then our decoding fails if the number of errors e and the number of erasures d satisfy 2e
2) Combining Blueberry Codes and Tree Codes: The second ingredient of our work is encoding via tree codes [28] , an online encoding that has a "self-healing" property: when decoding a stream at time n, the tree will decode correctly up to a particular time t such that the stream suffix between times t and n is the longest suffix in which the error rate is high. This means, for instance, that even if all the transmissions until some time t were corrupted (and thus the decoding failed at those times), if the noise rate up to time n > t is low enough, not only can we decode between t and n, but we will also be able to decode the entire stream up to time n.
Encoding via both a tree code and a Blueberry code immediately gives a streaming authentication method: the Blueberry code prevents the adversary from corrupting too many transmissions without being noticed, and given that the noise level is low enough, the tree code correctly decodes a prefix of the stream whose length is determined by the average noise level up to that time.
3) Efficient Constructions: The only caveat of the above construction is that tree code decoding is not necessarily efficient and may be in the worst case exponential in the length of the received transmission. We obtain an efficient authentication scheme by splitting the stream into small segments and repeatedly sending random segments of the history. That way, even if some part of the transmission was changed by the channel, the same information will keep being retransmitted at random future times, and eventually (with high probability) will be received at the other side intact.
Roughly speaking, we use n/ log n tree codes to encode chunks of the stream (each of length roughly log n). Note that as n grows, so does the number of the trees in use, and the expected depth of each tree. At each time step, we randomly select one of the n/ log n trees and transmit the next label of the path defined by the corresponding chunk of the stream. For most of the trees, the expected number of labels transmitted is (log n), and the decoding of the specific chunk succeeds except with polynomially small probability. Since each tree code is used to encode a word of length O(log n), the decoding can be performed efficiently by an exhaustive search.
C. Related Work
The works of Even, Goldreich and Micali [11] and Gennaro and Rohatgi [16] consider authentication of data streams, however the focus of these schemes is not only to authenticate the message but also to prevent the sender from denying having signed the information. These constructions rely on cryptographic primitives such as one-time signatures. Another related line of research [20] , [22] , [25] pursues authentication of streams over lossy channels, usually in the multicast setting.
Coding schemes that assume the parties preshare some randomness (also known as Private Codes [21] ) first appeared in [29] , and were greatly analyzed since. The main advantage of such codes is that they can deal with adversarial noise, rather than random noise. Langberg [21] considers private codes for adversarial channels that approach Shannon's bound and require only O(log n) randomness for block size n, as well as an (log n) lower bound for the needed randomness. The construction of Langberg also implies an efficient code with O(n log n) randomness. This result was improved to n + o(n) randomness by Smith [30] . Explicit constructions with o(n) randomness are yet unknown (see [30] ).
As mentioned above, the question of interactive communication was initiated by Schulman [26] , [28] . These works mainly focused on the a random noise model, in which every bit is flipped with some fixed probability. Nevertheless, the scheme of [28] can be applied to the adversarial noise model as well, and tolerates up to a fraction 1/240 of noise. Braverman and Rao [8] revisited this question and obtained a scheme that tolerates a maximal bound of up to a fraction 1/4 of noise. Braverman and Efremenko [7] refined the pursuit for the maximal tolerable noise, by splitting the communication into transmissions going from Alice to Bob and transmissions in the other direction, restricting the noise level separately in each direction of the channel. Within this setting, they give the exact region of noise in which interactive communication is possible.
A prominent drawback of the above schemes is that they take exponential time. For the case where the channels' noise is random rather than adversarial, Gelles, Moitra and Sahai [14] provided an efficient randomized scheme. For the adversarial noise model, Brakerski and Kalai [3] gave the first efficient scheme which tolerates a noise level of up to 1/32 in the binary case. [We note that our work improves also the bounds of 1/32 obtained by [3] , since we improve the bounds of the underlying scheme ( [8] ) used as a black box by [3] .] The computation efficiency was further improved by Brakerski and Naor [4] to quasi linear. The subsequent work of Ghaffari and Haeupler [17] provides an efficient scheme that tolerates the optimal noise level of 1/4 (for channels with large alphabets).
Our work has already given rise to several subsequent works. Gelles, Ostrovsky and Roytman [15] extend the question of communicating a data stream over a noisy channel to the sliding window model, in which the receiver needs to be able to decode only the last "window" (last N symbols), rather than the entire stream. Blueberry codes were used by Brassard et al. [5] to obtain an interactive scheme in the quantum setting that resists noise rates of up to 1/2. Blueberry codes also serve an interesting role in obtaining higher noise resilience in various models of adaptive interactive protocols, such as the "collision" model regarded by Ghaffari, Haeupler, and Sudan [18] , or the "silence" (pulse-communication) model explored by Agrawal, Gelles and Sahai [1] .
II. PRELIMINARIES, MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n], and for a finite set we denote by ≤n the set ∪ n k=1 k . The Hamming distance (x, y) of two strings x, y ∈ n is the number of indices i for which x i = y i . Throughout the paper, log() denotes the binary logarithm (base 2) and ln() denotes the natural logarithm (base e).
A. Shared (Private) Randomness Model
In this model, the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) have access to a random string R of unbounded length, which is unknown to the adversary (Eve). Protocols in this model are thus probabilistic, and are required to succeed with high probability over the choice of R. We assume that all the randomness comes from R and that for a fixed R the protocols are deterministic.
B. Tree Codes
A d-ary tree code [28] over alphabet is a rooted d-regular tree of arbitrary depth N whose edges are labeled with elements of . For any string x ∈ [d] ≤N , a d-ary tree code T implies an encoding of x, TCenc T (x) = w 1 w 2 ..w |x| with w i ∈ , defined by concatenating the labels along the path defined by x, i.e., the path that begins at the root and whose i -th node is the x i -th child of the (i − 1)-th node. We usually omit the subscript T when the tree is clear from the context. Note that tree code encoding is online: to communicate TCenc(xσ ) where σ ∈ [d] given that TCenc(x) was already communicated, we only need to send one symbol of . Hence, if | | = O(1) the encoding scheme has a constant rate.
For any two paths (strings) x, y ∈ [d] ≤N of the same length n, let be the longest common prefix of both x and y. Denote by anc(x, y) = n −| | the distance from the n-th level to the least common ancestor of paths x and y. A tree code has distance α if for any k ∈ [N] and any distinct x, y ∈ [d] k , the Hamming distance of TCenc(x) and TCenc(y) is at least α · anc(x, y).
For a string w ∈ n , decoding w using the tree code T means returning the string x ∈ [d] n whose encoding minimizes the Hamming distance to the received word, namely,
w).
A theorem by Schulman [28] proves that for any d and α < 1 there exists a d-ary tree code of unbounded depth and distance α over alphabet of size d O(1/(1−α)) . However, no efficient construction of such a tree is yet known. For a given depth N, Peczarski [24] gives a randomized construction for a tree code with α = 1/2 that succeeds with probability at least 1 − , and requires alphabet of size at least d O( √ log −1 ) . Braverman [6] gives a sub-exponential (in N) construction of a tree code, and Gelles, Moitra and Sahai [14] provide an efficient construction of a randomized relaxation of a tree code of depth N, namely a potent tree code, which is powerful enough as a substitute for a tree code in most applications. Moore and Schulman [23] provide a first candidate for efficient deterministic construction of tree codes, however their construction is based on a strong assumption regarding sums of exponents.
C. Communication Model
Our communication model consists of a channel ch : → subject to corruptions made by an adversary (or by the channel itself). The noise model is such that any symbol σ sent through the channel can turn into another symbolσ ∈ . It is not allowed to insert or delete symbols. For all of our applications we assume that one symbol σ i ∈ is sent at any time slot i . 2 We say that the adversarial corruption rate is c if for n transmissions, at most cn symbols were corrupted.
III. THE BLUEBERRY CODE
The Blueberry code is a simple information-theoretic message authentication code, and can be seen as a simple instantiation of the random codes of [19] .
be a random and independently chosen permutation. The Blueberry code maps a string x of arbitrary length n to
We denote such a code as B :
We use the Blueberry code in the shared-randomness model where the legitimate parties share the random permutations B i , unknown to the adversary. Although B i is a permutation on [L + 1], we actually use it to encode strings over a smaller alphabet [S + 1] with S < L; that is, we focus on the induced mapping B :
The adversary does not know the specific permutations B i , and has probability of at most S/L to change a transmission into a symbol whose pre-image is in
, we mark the transmission as an erasure (specifically, the decoding algorithm outputs ⊥); otherwise, this event is called an error.
Corollary 3.3: Let x ∈ [S + 1] n and assume B(x) is communicated over a noisy channel. Every symbol altered by the channel will cause either an error with probability S/L, or an erasure with probability 1 − S/L.
Assuming S L, most of the corruptions done by the channel are marked as erasures, and only a small fraction of the corruptions percolate through the Blueberry code and cause an error. Proof: Denote by z i the random variable which is 1 if the i -th corrupted-transmission is marked as an erasure and 0 otherwise. These are independent Bernoullis with probability 
S L ).
We will use the Blueberry code concatenated with another (outer) code that is less sensitive to erasures than to errors. From the outer code's point of view, this effectively increases the channel's "error rate resilience" from 1 − 2c to 1 − c(1 + S/L). The construction of the code B from independent B i 's allows us to encode and decode each x i independently, which is crucial for on-line applications in which the message x to be sent is not fully known in advance.
IV. ERROR CORRECTION OF DATA STREAMS As a simple exposition to our main result, we begin with a simple, non-efficient, constant-rate error-correction scheme for data streams that withstands noise c < 1/2 and decodes a prefix of length 1 −2c of the stream sent so far. The scheme is obtained by simply encoding the stream via a tree code T with large enough distance parameter α ∈ (0, 1) and a constant-size alphabet, which depends on α. 
that is, a prefix of the stream of length at least (1 − 2c)n − εn is correctly decoded. Proof: Assume Alice encodes each stream symbol using TCenc T () using some tree code T whose parameters we fix shortly.
For a specific time n, consider a stringx ∈ {0, 1} n , such that anc(x,x) ≥ (2c + ε)n. Due to the tree distance property, the Hamming distance between TCenc(x) and TCenc(x) is at least α(2c + ε)n. Assume Eve causes e errors, a maximal-likelihood decoding will prefer x overx as long as α(2c + ε)n > 2e. Since Eve's corruption rate is limited to c, we know that e ≤ cn. By setting α > 2c 2c+ε we guarantee that α(2c + ε)n > 2e, and Bob decodes a string x such that anc(x, x ) < (2c + ε)n with certainty.
V. PERPETUAL AUTHENTICATION Sending a data stream over a noisy channel is not a simple task, especially when the noise model is adversarial. Our goal is to design an encoding and decoding scheme such that the encoding has a constant rate and the decoding recovers the encoded transmitted stream, or else aborts. Furthermore, we wish an "authentication" guarantee, that is, if the decoding scheme did not abort, it decodes the correct data with high probability (note that the probability that the scheme aborts potentially differs from the probability that the decoding scheme outputs incorrect data). The amount of recoverable data depends on the noise and the goal is to output (and authenticate) the longest possible prefix of the stream, given a constant corruption rate. 
and if at most c(n) of the y i, j are corrupted, then
1) the scheme aborts with probability at most κ(n),
2) if not aborted, the probability to decode an incorrect γ (n)-prefix of the stream,
is at most κ(n). The rate of such a scheme is r log out log in . Eve is given both the raw stream and the channel transmissions, however she does not know the shared random string R used as the secret authentication key. It is desired that as long as Eve corrupts only a small fraction of the transmissions, Bob will be able to correctly decode a prefix of the stream, or otherwise be aware of the adversarial intervention and abort.
We show the following dichotomy: If the adversarial corruption rate is some constant c, then there exists a streaming authentication stream that decodes a prefix of at most (1 − c)-fraction of the stream received so far. In addition, there does not exist a streaming authentication scheme that is capable of decoding a longer prefix with non-negligible probability. 
where the probability is over the coin tosses of the decoding algorithm, assuming {x i } are uniformly, independently distributed.
We now prove Theorem 5.3 and then construct the protocols guaranteed by Theorem 5.2.
Proof: Consider an adversary that, starting at time (1−c)n, corrupts all the transmissions. It is easy to verify that the corruption rate is c. Clearly, from time (1 − c)n and on, the effective capacity of the channel is 0. This means that the decoder has no use of transmissions of times ≥ (1 − c)n and he decodes only using transmissions received up to time (1 − c)n. However, due to the streaming nature of the model, transmissions at times < (1 − c)n depend only on x 1 , . . . , x (1−c)n (the suffix of the stream is yet unknown to the sender). The receiver has no information about any bit x i with i > (1 − c)n and his best strategy is to guess them. The probability to correctly guess the last εn bits is at most 2 − εn .
In order to construct a streaming authentication scheme, we use two concatenated layers of online codes. The inner code is a Blueberry B : [S + 1] * → [L + 1] * code with a constant S and L, and the outer code A is an online code that allows a prefix decoding in the presence of errors and erasures. The entire process can be described by
We begin with a simple and elegant construction which, although not efficient, demonstrates the power of the Blueberry code.
Proposition 5 Proof: Assume that in order to encode the bitstream x 1 , x 2 , . . ., we use a binary tree code over alphabet [S + 1] with distance α to be determined later, concatenated with a Blueberry-code B :
We show that if at time n we decode a stringx 1 · · ·x n whose prefix
For a specific time n, consider a stringx ∈ {0, 1} n , such that anc(x,x) ≥ (c + ε)n. Due to the tree distance property, the Hamming distance between TCenc(x) and TCenc(x) is at least α(c +ε)n. Assume Eve causes d erasures and e errors, a maximal-likelihood decoding will prefer x overx as long as
If Eve's corruption rate is limited to c, Lemma 3.4 implies that with overwhelming probability at most 2cnS/L of these corruptions become errors and the rest are marked as erasures.
L ) we guarantee that with overwhelming probability α(c + ε)n > 2 · 2cnS/L + cn(1 − 2S/L), 3 thus Bob decodes a stringx such that anc(x,x) < (c + ε)n with overwhelming probability, as claimed.
Note that the actual fraction of adversarial corruptions can be estimated out of the number of erasures marked by the Blueberry code. We abort the decoding if at a specific time n the number of erasures exceeds cn. We note that although in the above proof we require ε to be constant, for the case of c = 0 (i.e., when the channel is not inherently noisy) we can let ε be smaller. For instance, if we let ε = κ/n for a security parameter κ, the scheme is comparable to a (non-streaming) authentication scheme with the same security parameter: in order to change even a single bit in a prefix of length n, after n+κ symbols were transmitted, the adversary must change at least ακ/2 transmissions, and will be caught except with probability 2 − (κ) . Since the above holds for any time n, we get a perpetual authentication of the stream. 3 It is required to have α < 1, thus the choice of (the constant) L should depend on ε and c, specifically, L > 2S c ε . Also note that S depends on α, however L is independent of both. For a fixed value of α (and S = d O (1/(1−α)) ) there is always a way to choose a constant L that satisfies the condition.
The case where c > 0 has a meaning of communicating over a noisy channel (regardless of the adversary). The users do not abort the authentication scheme although they know the message was changed by the channel. Instead, the scheme features both error-correction and authentication abilities and the parties succeed to recover (a prefix of) the original message with high probability.
A. Efficient Streaming Authentication
We now complete the proof of Theorem 5.2 by defining an efficient randomized code A eff for prefix-decoding in the presence of errors and erasures. The protocol partitions the stream into words of logarithmic size and encodes each using a tree code. At any time n, one of the O(n/ log n) words is chosen at random and its next encoded symbol is transmitted. The value n increases as the protocol progresses which means that the length of each encoded word increases as well. This however causes no problem: each word is encoded by a tree code (rather than, say, a block code), which is performed in an online manner without assuming knowledge of the word's length. Decoding can be performed efficiently by an exhaustive search since each word is of logarithmic length in the current time n. We note that the parties hold the entire stream in their memory throughout the protocol. This is different from the common practice of streaming algorithms, in which usually a single party (rather than two) wishes to compute some statistics of the stream using poly-logarithmic memory. log εn/4 , . . . , ( 
1−c−ε)n
log(1−c−ε)n }, then every string x k is selected by the encoding scheme (log n) times in expectation. In addition, a constant fraction of a specific tree's transmissions is received intact, while the expected number of errors is a smaller fraction, controlled by L. Therefore, a logarithmic prefix of the string x k can be decoded with high probability.
Lemma 5.6: Let c, ε be given. For a given time n and for every k ∈ K n , 1) the expected number of transmissions (i, j ) with ID(i, j ) = k is (c 0 log n).
2) if the corruption rate is at most c, then for transmissions
with ID(i, j ) = k, the expected number of transmissions not corrupted by the adversary is (c 0 log n) and the expected number of errors is (c 0 log n/L). Proof: Fix a k ∈ K n , and recall that Y k = {(i, j ) | ID(i, j ) = k}. It is easy to verify that
where the probability is over the shared randomness R. Assume that the channel's (Eve's) noise pattern is P = p 1 , . . . , p cn , with p i ∈ [n] × [c 0 ]. First let us bound the number of erroneous transmissions of symbols from Y k . For a specific instance of the scheme, let
We are interested in the (adversarial) corruption pattern that maximizes the expected number of these errors,
Since the decoding process ignores the first εn/4 transmissions, and since the expected number of errors is a S L -fraction of the corrupted transmissions in Y k , this equals to
, where the expectation is over the shared randomness R.
, and zero otherwise. The pattern P that maximizes Eve's probability to hit transmissions in
However, the decoding algorithm ignores the first εn/4 indices and Eve has no use in attacking them. Therefore, if P • ∩ [εn/4] = ∅, Eve's best strategy is to shift her attack to the window P = { εn/4 , εn/4 + 1, . . . , (ε/4 + c)n }.
where the second inequality applies to both the cases of empty and non-empty P • ∩ [εn/4], and c < 1 is some constant such that c i ≤ i − log i for i ≥ εn/4, for a sufficiently large n. H n is the n-th Harmonic number, and it holds that 0 < H n − ln(n) < 1.
We get max P E ERR k = O(c 0 log n/L).
On the other hand, we can lower bound the amount of uncorrupt transmissions in Y k . In a similar way to the above we define INTACT k = (i, j ) ∈ Y k ỹ i, j = y i, j , and wish to lower bound the quantity min P E INTACT k . It is easy to verify that Eve's strategy from above is optimal for this case as well, thus
Finally, define TOTAL k = |Y k | to be the total amount of transmissions with ID(i, j ) = k (erasures, errors, and intact). The expected amount of this quantity is at least
with some small constant c < 1 for a sufficiently large n. The sum begins from εn/4 since x k is declared only at time
. Since the number of intact transmissions is (c 0 log n), the total amount of transmissions is lower-bounded by the same quantity, thus E TOTAL k = (c 0 log n). At time n, assume max k∈K n E TOTAL k < C T log n and min k∈K n E[INTACT k ] > C I log n, and define β = C I /C T . Note that β is independent of n and c 1 . Fix k ∈ K n . Denote by BAD 1 the event that there were too many erasures and errors for the k-th codeword, i.e. INTACT k /TOTAL k < β/2, and by BAD 2 the event that there were not enough transmissions for the k-th codeword, TOTAL k < 2c 1 β log n. By an appropriate choice of c 0 = O(c, ε, c 1 , 1/β) , we can bound the probability of any bad event to be polynomially small. For a large enough c 0 we can assure that E TOTAL k > 4c 1 β log n, and thus by Chernoff, Pr[BAD 2 ] ≤ 2 − (log n) . Furthermore, a union bound gives
and by Chernoff inequality,
Conditioned on the fact that BAD 1 and BAD 2 did not occur, we know that n * > 2c 1 β log n symbols of TCenc(x k ) were transmitted, and the adversary has corrupted at most c * < (1 − β/2) fraction of these transmissions. Proposition 5.4 suggests that for an appropriate choice of constant L, we are able to decode a prefix of length at least ≈ (1 − c * )n * = c 1 log n except with probability exp(− (n * )) = exp(− (log n)). A union bound over all the possible k ∈ K n completes the proof.
We note that since each codeword is of length O(log n), decoding via exhaustive search can be performed with polynomial computational effort. Hence, it is easy to verify that both the encoding and decoding can be done efficiently. We also emphasize that each encoded symbol is of constant size, thus the scheme has a constant rate.
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 5.2, we are left to explain how to split the stream x 1 , x 2 , . . . into words {x 1 , x 2 , . . .} such that for any time n, the entire prefix
For every k, define x k to be the string that contains the stream prefix x t (k) downto x 1 concatenated with as many zeros as needed,
where t (k) is defined to be the minimal time such that t (k)/ log t (k) > k.
We say x k is declared at time t (k), meaning that only from this time and on the algorithm may choose to send symbols of the encoding of x k . It is easy to verify that the string x k is well defined at the time it is declared (the corresponding x i 's are known).
If some string x k is declared at time t (k) then x k+1 will be declared at time
By setting c 1 = 2 we are guaranteed that, for every εn/4 ≤ ≤ (1 − c − ε) n, x appears in a correctly decoded c 1 log nprefix of some x k with k ∈ K n . 
It is easy to verify that at time n, the string v n/ log n is well defined and known to the encoder. Lemma 5.9: For every time n > 256/(1 − c − ε), any bit x with 1 ≤ ≤ εn/4 appears in a 2 log n-prefix of (at least) one of the strings {v k } k∈K n .
Proof: Note that the concatenation of O(log n)-prefix of the v k s gives a string of the form
and V is decoded by A eff with high probability. 4 By taking c 1 = 2 and recalling that ε < (1 − c)/2, (and thus, (1 − c − ε) n/4 > εn/4) the length of V is lower bounded by the amount of indices in prefixes of size 2 log
where the last inequality holds for n > One cannot run A eff twice, once for {x} and once for {v}. Indeed, Eve can block all the transmissions of one of the instances, thus prevent the correct decoding of the stream with probability one, while her corruption rate does not exceed c = 1/2. One possible solution is to set c 1 = 4 and interleave the transmitted data, that is, define the set {z 1 , z 2 , . . .} where
. ., etc. 4 To be more accurate, V is a substring of the string decoded by the scheme. 
B. Extensions for Streaming Authentication
There are several possible extensions to the above results, which we now discuss. 
1) Decoding a Prefix Longer
1 − c − ε)n < t < n, such that for all 1 ≤ m ≤ t, Pr[x m = x m ] ≤ 2 − (|t −m|) .
Furthermore, Bob outputs estimators t min and t max such that
We begin by showing that any time t that satisfies the following suffix condition, is a time in which Bob will be able to decode the prefix of the stream up to almost t. Later (in Proposition 5.16) we show that Bob can get a very close estimation of the latest time that satisfies the suffix condition. The following Lemma guarantees that, for any γ ∈ (c, 1) it
Lemma 5.14: For every corruption rate c and constant
Proof: Look at a suffix y t +1 , . . . , y n for which the number of corruptions is strictly larger than cξ(n −t). If no such suffix exists then the lemma is true for y 1 , . . . , y n . Otherwise, discard y t +1 , . . . , y n , and repeat the process with y 1 , . . . , y t . At each iteration we remove more than cξ(n − t) corrupted transmissions and shorten the string by n − t symbols. Assume that the process stops with some prefix of length L < (1 − 1 ξ )n, then we have removed at least cξ(n − L) > cξ(n − n + n/ξ ) > cn corruptions which is a contradiction. Therefore, the entire process must stop with some prefix of length at
Let the corruption rate c and any ε > 0 be fixed, and set γ = c/(c + ε). Then, for any time n that satisfies the γ -suffix condition, Bob will correctly decode almost all the way up to n. That is, the probability that a bit that is located t indices away from n was not correctly decoded decreases exponentially in n − t. Formally,
Lemma 5.15: Let c and be given and let γ = c/(c + ).
Assume that time n satisfies the γ -suffix condition, and let x 1 , . . . , x n be the string Bob outputs at time n in the protocol of Proposition 5.4. Then, for any t < n,
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that Bob recovers the stream correctly only until time t < n. It follows that the errors and erasures in the [t, n] suffix (e and d respectively,) satisfy 2e+d ≥ α(n−t). However, we know that n satisfies the γ -suffix condition so e+d < γ (n −t). Except with probability 2 − (n−t ) it holds that 2e 
Proof: Consider the following procedure for estimating N γ .
Let c ∈ [0, 1) be given. For an input γ ∈ (c, 1), at time n, Bob tries to find the longest suffix that satisfies the γ -suffix condition. To this end Bob performs the following. For the case where t > N γ , we note that time t does not satisfy the γ -suffix condition, therefore there must exist some time t 1 < t, for which the number of corruptions in the interval [t 1 , t] is more than γ (t − t 1 ). If t 1 > N γ , then there must exist time t 2 and interval [t 2 , t 1 ] that doesn't satisfy the γ -suffix condition. We repeat this reasoning until we find the first interval [t j , t j −1 ] such that t j < N. By considering the union of all these intervals, it follows that the number of corruptions in We note that Bob can repeat the same procedure and compute a value N γ which usually upper-bounds N γ , by finding the latest time i for which every suffix [t, i ] has less than γ (i − t)(1 − 1 2 S L ) corruptions. As above, the probability of the bad event that N γ < N γ is exponentially small in (N γ − N γ ) . This completes the proof of Theorem 5.11.
2) Increasing the Authentication 'Trust': It is possible to improve the efficient scheme of Theorem 5.2 so that it aborts with polynomially small probability, however, given that it did not abort, the probability that the decoded prefix is incorrect is exponentially small. More accurately, the 'trust' Bob has in the decoded string increases with the amount of received transmissions. Thus, except for the last fraction of the stream, the decoded stream is identical to the one sent by Alice with overwhelming probability. 
Proof: The main idea is to add a parallel transmission of random hash values of the entire stream (up to time n), where the hash length is logarithmic in n. 5 More formally, define an additional set of infinite strings {h 1 , h 2 , . . . }. We identify a string a = a 1 a 2 · · · a n with the n-dimensional vector (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), and define h k in the following way. Randomly pick a matrix R k ∈ {0, 1} log t (k)×t (k) and a vector V k ∈ {0, 1} log t (k) and set
concatenated with as many zeroes as needed. The strings {h k } are interleaved with the strings {x k } and {v k }, and c 1 increases as explained in Section V-A. We call the resulting scheme A eff with hash testing.
Proposition 5.5 guarantees that except with polynomially small probability in n all the hash values {h k } k∈K n are correctly decoded. The decoding at time n aborts if any of the hash values {h k } k∈K n mismatches the corresponding prefix
The theorem immediately follows from the next Proposition. Proposition 5.18: Given that A eff with hash testing did not abort, let x be the decoded stream, then for every
Eve is oblivious of R i and V i , thus for any two vectorsx ∈ {0, 1} t (i) ,h ∈ {0, 1} log t (i) chosen by Eve,
Clearly, the smaller is, the more hash values that are checked to be consistent with the decoded x . For > εn/4 there are at least ((1 − c − ε)n − )/2 log n independent hash values of stream prefixes longer than , where the smallest hash length is ≈ log(εn/4). Hence, the probability that x = x yet the decoding procedure did not abort is at most 2 − log(εn/4)
Clearly, for < εn/4 there are as many hash tests as for = εn/4, thus the probability to incorrectly decode x with < εn/4 is exponentially small in n as well. Finally, for the case where ((1 − c − ε)n − ) < log n we note that at least one hash value must be consistent, h (1−c−ε) n/ log(1−c−ε)n . The probability to incorrectly decode x and pass the hash check is at most 2 − (log n) , which completes the proof.
3) Reducing the Amount of Shared Randomness: Our schemes rely on the fact that the parties share a random string whose length increases with the size of the information to be communicated. Specifically, at any time n our efficient scheme of Theorem 5.2, which we did not try to optimize in that aspect, uses O(log n) random bits. It is possible that the amount of randomness can be reduced, similar to the case of randomized block codes. See Section I-C for the state of the art regarding the randomness need for such codes.
This assumption is sometimes not satisfied in practical applications, especially when considering a multiparty setting in which any two parties run a separate instance of the scheme. We can mitigate the need for a long shared randomness if the adversary is assumed to be polynomial, assuming standard cryptographic assumptions (specifically, hardness of DDH). To this end, each user generates a pair (sk, pk) of a secret and a public key, broadcasts the public key pk and keeps sk secret. When two users initiate an authentication scheme instance, they first perform a Diffie-Hellman [9] key exchange and obtain an authentication key. They both use the authentication key as a seed to a pseudo-random-generator that generates a long random string for the authentication scheme. Under the DDH assumption, a polynomially-bounded adversary has only negligible information about the authentication key nor the generated randomness, and the authentication scheme remains secure. The proof is quite straightforward and we omit the details here.
VI. INTERACTIVE COMMUNICATION
In this section we extend our discussion to the two-way communication model of interactive communication. We show that for adversarial corruption rate of 1/2 or higher, no constant-rate protocol can compute functions that require interaction between the parties, while with the usage of the Blueberry code we show how to construct a protocol for any function assuming adversarial corruption rate below 1/2. We begin by defining the interactive communication model.
Assume that Alice and Bob wish to compute some function f : X × Y → Z, where Alice holds x ∈ X and Bob holds y ∈ Y in the shared-randomness model. The computation is performed interactively for T rounds: every round, the parties communicate a message which depends on their input and previous transmissions. At the end of the computation Alice outputs z A ∈ Z and Bob outputs z B ∈ Z, and we say that f was correctly computed if z A = z B = f (x, y). Again, we restrict ourselves to protocols with a constant rate: those take O(T ) rounds, in each of which the parties are allowed to send a single message out of a constant size alphabet (i.e., the alphabet size is independent of T ).
We show the following separation theorems, Proof (Theorem 6.1): Assume that the protocol takes N rounds. Furthermore, recall that in our model it is assumed that at each round both parties send exactly one message. 6 Hence and without loss of generality, Alice is the sender of at most N/2 of the transmissions. Eve corrupts all the transmissions originated by Alice (causing at least an erasure in each one of these transmissions). Effectively, the unidirectional channel from Alice to Bob has a zero capacity, and it cannot be that Bob correctly computes f (x, y) with probability higher than guessing f (x, y) given only y.
It is interesting to note that if f only depends on one of its inputs, then only one-way communication is required and c = 1 2 is no longer a limit, as discussed in Section V. We now construct a protocol that correctly computes any f (x, y) with overwhelming probability as long as the adversarial corruption rate is 1 2 − ε for ε > 0. To this end, we concatenate a Blueberry code to an optimal interactive protocol for computing f (x, y) over a noisy channel.
Let us recall how to construct a constant-rate protocol for computing f (x, y) over a noisy channel with noise rate up to 1/4 [8] . We start with an interactive protocol π for f (x, y) that assumes a noiseless channel. We assume that π consists of T rounds in which Alice and Bob send a single bit according to their input and previous transmissions. Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice sends her bits at odd rounds while Bob transmits at even rounds. We can view the computation of π as a root-leaf walk along a binary tree in which odd levels correspond to Alice's messages and even levels to Bob's, see Figure 3 .
In order to obtain a protocol that withstands (a low rate of) channel noise, Alice and Bob simulate the construction of path P along the π-tree. The users transmit edges of P one by one, where each user transmits the next edge that extends the partial path transmitted so far. 7 This process is repeated for N = T /(1 − α) times, for some constant α < 1 to be set later. In [8] it is shown that unless the noise rate exceeds 1/4, after N rounds both parties will decode the entire path P. We refer the reader to [8] for a full description of the protocol Fig. 3 . A π -tree showing the path P (bold edges) taken by Alice and Bob for computing f (x, y). Dashed edges represent the hypothetical reply of Alice and Bob given that a different path P was taken (when such replies are defined). and correctness proof. We now extend the analysis for the case of channels with errors and erasures.
To simplify the explanation, assume that each transmission is over the alphabet = {0, . . . , N} × {0, 1} ≤2 . Intuitively, the transmission (e, s) ∈ means "extend the path P by taking at most two steps defined by s starting at the child of the edge I have transmitted at transmission number e". Although this alphabet is not of constant size, it is easy to obtain a constant size alphabet by encoding each (e, s) into a delimited binary string (see [8, Sec. 6] ). Each symbol (e, s) is communicated to the other side via a | |-ary tree code with distance α and alphabet , and then encoded via a Blueberry code B : [S + 1] * → [L + 1] * with |S + 1| = | | and S/L to be determined later. Specifically, at time n Alice computes a n ∈ , the last symbol of TCenc((e, s) 1 , . . . , (e, s) n ) = a 1 a 2 · · · a n , and communicates B n (a n ); Bob, after decoding the Blueberry code receivesã n ∈ ∪ {⊥}, possibly with added noise or an erasure mark (similarly, Bob's labels are b n , and Alice receives a noisy or deleted versionb n ). Let TCdec(ã 1 , . . . ,ã n ) denote the string Bob decodes at time n (similarly, Alice decodes TCdec(b 1 , . . . ,b n ) ). (a 1 , . . . , a i ) and TCenc(a 1 , . . . , a i ) must be at least α(i − m(i )). It is immediate that for Bob to make such a decoding error, N a ≥ α(i − m(i )). Lemma 6.5 ([8] Proof: The proof is taken from [8] : Without loss of generality, assume that the k-th edge of P describes Alice's move. Suppose t (k −1) ≤ m(i ) and t (k) > i +1. Then it must be the case that the first k − 1 edges of P have already been announced within the first m(i ) transmissions of both parties, yet the k-th edge has not. By the protocol definition, Alice will announce this edge at round i + 1, in contradiction to our assumption that t (k) > i + 1.
Next we show that if at some time i the length of the proposed P is not long enough (less than k), then many transmissions must have been corrupted. The above Lemmas allow us to complete the proof of Theorem 6.2 by showing that if the simulation of P failed, there must have been "too many" corruptions.
Proof (Theorem 6.2) : Assume an unsuccessful run of the simulation protocol. That is, the simulation of the path P has failed, m(N) < t (T ). The number of adversarial corruptions throughout the protocol is given by N (1, N) = N (1, m(N Yet, assume the adversary is restricted to corrupt at most c = 1/2 − ε fraction of the 2N = 2 T 1−α transmissions, then Lemma 3.4 guarantees that with overwhelming probability there will be at least 2cN(1−2S/L) erasures. This implies that with overwhelming probability N (1, N) ≤ 2cN(1 + 2S/L). For any 0 < ε ≤ 1/2 we can choose constants α < 1 and L > S such that α 2 > (1 − 2ε)(1 + 2S/L) and conclude that the protocol succeeds with overwhelming probability over the shared randomness. We make the simple observation, that the shared randomness (i.e., the Blueberry code) is used for the main purpose of detecting Eve's noise, transforming corrupted symbols into erasures. With the above analysis, it immediately follows that the Braverman-Rao scheme [8] resists a maximal noise rate of 1/2 − ε over an erasure channel. Such channels are modeled as a function ch : → ∪ {⊥}, where each transmitted symbol either goes through intact, or turns into an erasure mark {⊥}. The parties need not preshare any randomness nor use the Blueberry code, since the adversary is restricted to only making erasures to begin with. 
